Efficient collusion in optimal auctions

Vianney Dequiedt ()

Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL)

Abstract: We study collusion in an IPV auction with binary type spaces. Collusion is organized by a third-party than can manipulate participation decisions. We characterize the optimal response of the seller to different threats of collusion among the bidders. We show that, contrary to the prevailing view that assymmetric information imposes transaction costs in side-contracting, collusion in the optimal auction is efficient when the third-party can implement monetary transfers as well as when it can implement monetary transfers and reallocations of the good. The threat of non-participation in the auction by a subset of bidders is crucial in constraining the seller's profit.

Keywords: COLLUSION; THIRD PARTY; OPTIMAL AUCTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://gael.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/sites/default/ ... 2006/gael2006-10.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Efficient collusion in optimal auctions (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gbl:wpaper:200607

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Adrien Hervouet ().