When a precedent of donation favors defection in the Prisoner's dilemma

Alexis Garapin, D. Llerena and M. Hollard

Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL)

Abstract: In this paper we examine the question of wether a collective activity can influence cooperation in a subsequent repeated one shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. We conduct two series of experiments. The first consists of control experiments in which 30 periods of a PD game are played, with a random re-matching of the pairs in every period. In a second series of experiments, subjects first play a donation game and then the PD game. In the donation game they collectively discuss the amount of a donation to a given charity, before putting the question to an individual and anonymous vote. Cooperation levels in the PD games preceded by the donation game are signficantly lower than those observed in the control experiment.

Keywords: DONATION; COOPERATION; DEFECTION; REPEATED ONE SHOT PRISONER'S DILEMMA; EXPERIMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Related works:
Journal Article: When a Precedent of Donation Favors Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma (2011)
Journal Article: When a Precedent of Donation Favors Defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (2011)
Working Paper: When a Precedent of Donation Favors Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gbl:wpaper:201007

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