Paying not to sell

Emanuele Bacchiega, Olivier Bonroy and R. Mabrouk

Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL)

Abstract: In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good produced by that firm.

Keywords: MONOPOLY; VERTICAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION; VERTICAL RELATIONSHIPS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L12 L13 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Paying not to sell (2013)
Working Paper: Paying not to sell (2013)
Working Paper: Paying not to sell (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2013-02

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