Comparing regulations to protect the commons: an experimental investigation

Stefan Ambec, Alexis Garapin, L. Muller, Arnaud Reynaud and C. Sebi

Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL)

Abstract: In a laboratory experiment we test the three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterougeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non transferable quotas? We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users' profits compared to free-access extraction. We compare the regulations according to five criteria: resource preservation, individual profits, profit difference, Pareto-improvement from free-access and sorting of the most efficient users. One of the main findings is that, even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects, the fee and subsidy scheme is not the more profitable than tradable quotas.

Keywords: COMMON-POOL RESOURCE; REGULATION; QUOTA; PERMIT; TAX (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 Q28 Q38 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-exp and nep-reg
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https://gael.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/sites/default/ ... 2013/gael2013-08.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation (2014)
Working Paper: Comparing regulations to protect the commons: An experimental investigation (2014)
Working Paper: Comparing regulations to protect the commons: an experimental investigation (2009)
Working Paper: Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2013-07

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