Changing partner in a cheap talk game: experimental evidence

Olivier Bonroy, Alexis Garapin and D. Llerena

Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL)

Abstract: This paper considers the effects of the opportunity to change partners on communication. We experiment a standard cheap talk game where a player observes a private forecast before disclosing it (truthfully or untruthfully) in a message that he/she sends to his/her partner. Two treatments are applied: i) each two-player team remains unchanged until the experiment ends; and ii) players are offered the possibility to change their partner. We find that the opportunity to change partners affects communication in the relationship positively. Interestingly, this effect is explained by more beliefs in the messages and not by more truthful disclosure.

Keywords: ASYMMETRIC DOMINANCE EDITING; ATTRACTION EFFECT; COMPARABILITY; CONSUMER CHOICE; EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS; PRICING FORMATS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Changing partners in a cheap talk game: Experimental evidence (2017)
Working Paper: Changing partners in a cheap talk game: Experimental evidence (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2014-05

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