On taxes and subsidies with private eco-labeling

I. Barry, Olivier Bonroy and Paolo Garella

Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL)

Abstract: Taxes and subsidies on products embodying environmental qualities often coexist with certified private labels---like Ecocert, Scientific Certification System, or OEKO-TEX. Their interaction is yet quite unexplored. We analyze a duopoly where consumers value an environmental quality, with an externality. A certifier sets the quality standard for a label. The fee for granting the label is either set by the certifier (certifier power), or in a noncooperative bidding game (firm power). Taxes and subsidies then affect the fee, depending upon how this is set, and the standard. This channel can produce distorted or even reversed effects. If firm power exists, for instance, a subsidy to the labeled good ends up decreasing the environmental quality and welfare. Conversely, absence of firm power nullifies the effects of ad valorem taxing the unlabeled "dirty" product. Only a per unit tax has similar, but always worsening, effects.

Keywords: LABELS; ECOLABELS; PRIVATE CERTIFICATION; ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; TAX; SUBSIDY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L15 L5 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-ind and nep-mkt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://gael.univ-grenoble-alpes.fr/sites/default/ ... 2015/gael2015-09.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: On taxes and subsidies with private eco-labeling (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gbl:wpaper:2015-09

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Adrien Hervouet ().