Alternative Solutions to the Odious Debt Problem

Mitu Gulati and Ugo Panizza
Additional contact information
Mitu Gulati: Duke Law School

No 02-2020, IHEID Working Papers from Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies

Abstract: The doctrine of state succession requires that governments honor the international commitments of their predecessors. Even if a dictator borrows to oppress his own citizens, future generations are required to service the debts and commitments contracted by the dictator. This paper starts by briefly describing possible exceptions to this doctrine by focusing on war and hostile debts. Next, the paper reviews the literature on odious debt and discusses two proposals that could address this issue by using domestic legal principles.

Keywords: Odious Debt; Sovereign Default; Sovereign Debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G15 H63 K34 O54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2020-02-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Journal Article: Alternative Solutions to the Odious Debt Problem (2020)
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