The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France before World War I

Vincent Bignon and Marc Flandreau

No 15-2010, IHEID Working Papers from Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies

Abstract: This article analyzes the economics of “badmouthing” in the context of the pre-1914 French capital market. We argue that badmouthing was a means through which racketeering journals sought to secure property rights over issuers’ reputation. We provide a theoretical study of the market setup that emerged to deal with such problems, and we test our predictions using new evidence from contemporary sources.

Keywords: badmouthing; capital market; reputation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2010-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France Before World War I (2011)
Working Paper: The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France before World War I (2010)
Working Paper: The Economics of Badmouthing: Libel Law and the Underworld of the Financial Press in France before World War I (2010)
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