Can Social Norms Affect the International Allocation of Innovation?

Guido Cozzi

Working Papers from Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow

Abstract: If economic agents coordinate on social norms more oriented towards the protection of national industries, an asymmetric international specialization in the research and development (R&D) arises even in a tariff free world with no a priori differences across countries in endowments, demography or technology. This paper exploits the indifference in the composition of R&D expenditure across sectors of the typical multi-sector Schumpeterian framework (forward-looking decisions, CRS R&D technology and free entry) to construct a theory of the international allocation of innovation and education based on sunspot equilibrium. A role for industrial policies as mere coordination devices emerges in an international Schumpeterian framework. The implications for the relationships between inequality and growth are examined.

Keywords: Schumpeterian Growth Theory; Inequality; International Trade; Social Norms; Indeterminacy; Sunspots. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D33 F43 O32 O41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-opm and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_61073_en.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gla:glaewp:2008_02

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Business School Research Team ().