Upstream Innovation Protection: Common Law Evolution and the Dynamics of Wage Inequality

Guido Cozzi and Silvia Galli ()

Working Papers from Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow

Abstract: What is the most innovation-enhancing level of patent protection for the new ideas generated within the framework of multi-stage sequential innovation? How does increasing early innovation appropriability affect basic research, applied research, education, and wage inequality? What does the common law system imply on the macroeconomic responses to institutional change? We show how the jurisprudential changes in intellectual property rights witnessed in the US after 1980 can be related to the well-known increase in wage inequality and in education attainments. A Schumpeterian general equilibrium approach is followed.

Keywords: Basic and Applied R&D; Sequential Innovation; Skill Premium; Inequality and Education; Research Exemption; Common Law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O31 O33 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-lab and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_118216_en.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Upstream innovation protection: common law evolution and the dynamics of wage inequality (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gla:glaewp:2009_20

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Business School Research Team ().