Non-Cooperative Asymptotic Oligopoly in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities

Sayantan Ghosal and Simone Tonin

Working Papers from Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow

Abstract: In this paper, we extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economies with in nitely many commodities by using strategic market games. This setting can be in- terpreted as a model of oligopoly with di erentiated commodities by using the Hotelling line. We prove the existence of an \active" Cournot-Nash equilibrium and show that, when traders are replicated, the price vector and the allocation converge to the Wal- ras equilibrium. We examine how the notion of oligopoly extends to our setting with a coutable in nity of commodities by distinguishing between asymptotic oligopolists and asymptotic price-takers. We illustrate these notions via a number of examples.

JEL-codes: C72 D43 D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Non-Cooperative Asymptotic Oligopoly in Economies with Infinitely Many Commodities (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gla:glaewp:2014_15

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