A composition-consistency characterization of the plurality rule

Emel Öztürk

Working Papers from Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow

Abstract: We consider a collective choice problem in which the number of alternatives and the number of voters may vary. The two fundamental axioms in such a setting are reinforcement and composition-consistency. The former guarantees that the social choice rule cannot be manipulated by partitioning the electorate into sub-electorates. The latter guarantees that the rule cannot be manipulated by altering the set of alternatives entering an election via a procedure called cloning. Brandl et al. (2016) show that reinforcement and composition-consistency are incompatible. We propose a plausible weakening of composition-consistency called composition-consistency for dominated clones. We show that there is only one social choice rule that satisfies reinforcement, unanimity and composition- consistency for dominated clones. The rule is the well-known plurality rule which selects the alternatives top-ranked by the largest number of voters.

Keywords: Plurality rule; cloning-consistency; composition-consistency; reinforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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