Learning and Acyclicity in the Market Game

Arthur Dolgopolov () and Cesar Martinelli
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Arthur Dolgopolov: Department of Economics, European University Institute

No 1084, Working Papers from George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science

Abstract: We show that strategic market games, the non-cooperative implementation of a matching with transfers or an assignment game, are weakly acyclic. This property ensures that many common learning algorithms will converge to Nash equilibria in these games, and that the allocation mechanism can therefore be de- centralized. Convergence hinges on the appropriate price clearing rule and has di erent properties for better- and best-response dynamics. We tightly characterize the robustness of this convergence in terms of so-called schedulers for both types of dynamics.

Pages: 39
Date: 2021-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-isf and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gms:wpaper:1084

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