On the Origins of Moral Hazard: Politics, International Finance and the Latin American Debt Crisis of 1982

Carlo Edoardo Altamura and Juan Flores Zendejas

No unige:82509, Working Papers from University of Geneva, Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History

Abstract: A consensus has not been reached in the ongoing debate on the effects of lender of last resort functions by the IMF, given the contradictory results from macroeconomic analyses that depend upon samples and periods. This paper sheds new light on the relationship between international banks and their home governments, the IMF and international regulators during the years that preceded the debt crisis of 1982. Based on new archival evidence, we find that commercial banks' decisions to lend were largely based on home governments' preferences, competition, and the assumption that home governments and international organizations would provide lending of last resort functions to support borrowing governments. These factors also influenced loan pricing. While previous works suggest that the 1982 debt crisis was unexpected, we show that banks reacted to the deteriorating macroeconomic situation in many emerging economies once the role of international organizations as lenders of last resort became uncertain.

Keywords: Sovereign debt markets; Sovereign defaults; International finance; Moral hazard; Country risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F3 F5 N2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 p.
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-hpe and nep-opm
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