 Agency, perception and the economics of internal warsKelly Nelson International Journal of Development and Conflict, 2012, vol. 2, issue 1, 1250002 Abstract: Economic approaches to armed conflict have largely explained rational choice among rebel groups through quantitative analyses that focus on structural variables and ignore agency. This paper is an empirical analysis of decision-making among rebel groups in civil wars focusing on variables that actors influence. The hypothesis was that rebels calculated their expected gains and opportunity costs when deciding to engage in a civil war and that the rebels and government manipulated these expectations intentionally through actions or unintentionally through perception. In two case studies, the governments' actions to increase the opportunity cost and input cost of rebellion, the rebels' actions to lower their input costs and increase their chances of victory, and the rebels' perceptions regarding their probability of victory all influenced decisions. The evidence supported the hypothesis that rebellion is a rational choice and demonstrated that agency and perceptions were more important than structural factors to the decisions. Keywords: Bias; bounded rationality; conflict; government expenditures (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gok:ijdcv1:v:2:y:2012:i:1:p:1250002 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article International Journal of Development and Conflict is currently edited by Partha Gangopadhyay More articles in International Journal of Development and Conflict from Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics Contact information at EDIRC. |
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