Politics and investment: Examining the territorial allocation of public investment in Greece

Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, Yannis Psycharis and Vassilis Tselios

No 1502, Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization from Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network

Abstract: This paper discusses how electoral politics shapes the regional allocation of public investment expenditures per capita in Greece. Using regional public investment data for 10 political periods (1975-2009), combined with electoral data by constituency, a model is proposed which captures the influence of politics on the regional distribution of public investment expenditures. The results of the analysis point to a strong relationship between electoral results and regional public investment spending. Greek governing parties have tended to reward those constituencies returning them to office. Moreover, an increase in both the absolute and relative electoral returns of the governing party in a region has traditionally been followed by greater public investment per capita in that region. Regions where the governing party (whether Liberal or Socialist) has held a monopoly of seats have been the greatest beneficiaries of this type of pork-barrel politics.

Keywords: public investment; elections; pork-barrel politics; political geography; Greece (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H50 H77 R12 R58 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2015-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-geo, nep-pol and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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http://infogen.webs.uvigo.es/WP/WP1502.pdf First version, 2015 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Politics and investment: examining the territorial allocation of public investment in Greece (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gov:wpaper:1502

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