Decentralization and electoral swings

Ignacio Lago and André Blais

No 1805, Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization from Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network

Abstract: We explore how the uniformity of electoral swings in the district vote within countries is affected by the level of economic and political decentralization. We rely on district-level data from OECD countries in two consecutive elections before and after the Great Recession to show that as regional governments exert more influence over the central government, districts deviate less from the overall pattern of change in support of the national incumbent party. The causal mechanism accounting for the effect of decentralization on dynamic nationalization is examined with individual panel data from national elections in Canada and Spain.

Keywords: Decentralization; dynamic nationalization; electoral swing; Great Recession. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2018-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-ure
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http://infogen.webs.uvigo.es/WP/WP1805.pdf First version, 2018 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gov:wpaper:1805

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