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Making mobilization work: The choice of electoral systems

Ignacio Lago

No 2102, Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization from Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network

Abstract: This paper examines the adoption of electoral systems in the last two centuries. I argue that proportional representation (PR) was adopted to make party mobilization more effective when majoritarian electoral systems with many and geographically small districts were no longer an efficient response to the problem of collective action in mass elections. With the expansion of suffrage and the parallel process of national integration, mass parties became technologically feasible and took care of bringing voters to the ballot box. As primary and secondary mobilization are more effective in electoral systems with few and geographically large districts, majoritarian rules were progressively replaced with proportional rules. PR was endorsed by those parties that found it easier to attract voters using a single mobilization strategy with strong economics of scale, and resisted by locally focused parties. This argument is tested using longitudinal and cross section data at both the country and party levels.

Keywords: Collective Action; Electoral System; Nationalization; Mobilization; Political Parties; Proportional Representation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H72 H74 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
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http://infogen.webs.uvigo.es/WP/WP2102.pdf First version, 2021 (application/pdf)

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