Law, State Power, and Taxation in Islamic History

Metin Cosgel (), Rasha Ahmed () and Thomas Miceli

No 08/02, Papers on Economics of Religion from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: This paper studies the unique nature, institutional roots, and economic consequences of the ruler’s political power in Islamic History. An influential interest group in Islamic societies has been the legal community, whose power could range from being able to regulate the rulers to being entirely under their control. The struggle was over the provision of legal goods and services, the legal community gradually gaining control of the law in history and the rulers seeking to appropriate political power by controlling the legal community. The economic consequence of power was the ability to dictate the choice of tax bases and rates.

Keywords: state power; taxation; political economy; Islamic Law; legal community (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 K3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2008-01-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-hpe, nep-law, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/paoner/per08_02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Law, state power, and taxation in Islamic history (2009)
Working Paper: Law, State Power, and Taxation in Islamic History (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:paoner:08/02

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