Income Redistribution and Public Good Provision in a Diverse Society

Selim Ergun ()

No 09/04, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: I analyze the post-electoral coalition formation process in a two dimensional political environment. The two dimensions are the degree of a proportional tax rate and the degree of a group-speci?c public good. Parties are o¢ ce-motivated and care instrumentally about policy. I analyze when stable coalitions exist and obtain that for that to occur o¢ ce bene?ts should exceed a certain level. I analyze how this critical level and the set of policies implemented are a¤ected by the income levels and the degree of diversity. For both o¢ ce and policy-motivated parties the same result holds but the critical level might be lower.

Keywords: Electoral competition; coalition formation; public goods; income redistribution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H10 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2009-09-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pol
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http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers09_04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Income Redistribution and Public-Good Provision in a Diverse Society (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:09/04

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