The Ends Against the Middle. Attitudes Towards Taxation

Ana I. Moro Egido () and Angel Solano Garcia ()
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Ana I. Moro Egido: Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Ana Isabel Moro-Egido

No 15/03, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: Recent tax evasion scandals have brought into question the progressivity of taxation in many EU countries. In this paper we analyze the effect of the concern about tax evasion on people’s attitudes towards taxation in EU countries. We find that concern about tax evasion may produce a U-shaped relationship between an individual’s income and preferences for taxation in line with recent theoretical studies. Moreover, we find that the perceived level of tax evasion, the perceived waste of public resources and the intensity of tax enforcement reduce public support for taxation. In contrast, concern about fairness in tax compliance favours it.

Keywords: attitudes; taxation; tax evasion; multilevel models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 H3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2015-07-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-iue and nep-pbe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:15/03

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