Preferences for efficiency, rather than preferences for morality, drive cooperation in the one-shot Stag-Hunt Game

Valerio Capararo, Ismael Rodriguez-Lara and Maria J. Ruiz Martos ()
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Valerio Capararo: Department of Economics, Middlesex University.
Maria J. Ruiz Martos: Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Maria Jose Ruiz-Martos ()

No 19/10, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: Recent work highlights that cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is primarily driven by moral preferences for doing the right thing, rather than social preferences for equity or efficiency. By contrast, little is known on what motivates cooperation in the Stag-Hunt Game (SHG). Cooperation in the SHG fundamentally differs from cooperation in the PD in that it is not costly, but risky: players have no temptation to deviate from the cooperative outcome, but cooperation only pays off if the other player cooperates. Here, we provide data from a large (N=436), pre-registered, experiment. Contrary to what has been observed for the PD, we find that SHG cooperation is primarily driven by preferences for efficiency, rather than preferences for doing the right thing.

Keywords: morality; cooperation; efficiency; risky choices; stag-hunt game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2019-08-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Journal Article: Preferences for efficiency, rather than preferences for morality, drive cooperation in the one-shot Stag-Hunt game (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:19/10

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