Manipulability in the cost allocation of transport systems

Teresa Estañ, Natividad Llorca, Ricardo Martinez () and Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano
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Teresa Estañ: Centro de Investigación Operativa (CIO), Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche.
Natividad Llorca: Centro de Investigación Operativa (CIO), Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche.

No 20/08, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: In this work we study the allocation of the maintenance cost of a tram line that goes across several cities. Each city may have one or several stations. Information about the flow of passengers between any pair of stations is available. We particularly focus on the distribution of the fixed part of the cost (salaries of the executive staff, repair facilities, or fixed taxes). As our main finding, we obtain that the cost must be allocated proportionally to the number of stations, as long as we require some conditions on fairness and non-manipulability.

Keywords: axiom; cost sharing; fairness; non-manipulability; proportionality. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2020-08-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-tre
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:20/08

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