Network effects or rent extraction? Evidence from editorial board rotation

Lorenzo Ductor () and Bauke Visser
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Lorenzo Ductor: Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.

No 22/13, ThE Papers from Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.

Abstract: A department’s yearly publication count in a journal increases when a member of the department joins the journal’s editorial board. The common interpretation of this fact—that during the board member’s tenure, departmental colleagues publish more—is inaccurate. In a sample of 106 economics journals covering 1990-2011, we estimate that of the observed increase in the publication count, 73 per cent is (co-)authored by board members themselves. Their single-authored papers in a journal receive significantly less citations if they are on that journal’s editorial board. We find no evidence that they discover attractive papers among their colleagues that otherwise wouldn’t be published.

Keywords: Editorial boards; Networks; Colleague; Coauthor; Rent extraction; Publishing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A11 A14 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2022-09-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-net, nep-soc and nep-sog
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gra:wpaper:22/13

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