Towards an Economics of Convention-based Approach of the European Competition Policy

Frédéric Marty

No 2014-06, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: Our paper aims at developing an analysis of the European competition law enforcement dynamics based on an economics of conventions' framework. We question the ordoliberal theoretical foundations of the EU competition policy and we assess to what extent the implementation of a "more economic approach" might pertain to a convention inspired by the Chicago School normative views. We question the economic history, the history of economics thought, and the legal history as we consider that the European courts case law is the main driving force of conventional shifts in matter of competition law enforcement.

Keywords: Competition policy; abuse of dominant position; ordoliberalism; Chicago school competition law and economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 K21 L41 N44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2014-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hme and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Forthcoming in Historical Social Research (HSR)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2014-06

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