An Experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games

Takashi Yamada and Nobuyuki Hanaki
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Takashi Yamada: Faculty of Global and Science Studies, Yamaguchi University, Japan

No 2015-34, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: We experimentally study Lowest Unique Integer Games (LUIGs). In a LUIG, N (>3) players submit a positive integer up to M and the player choosing the smallest number not chosen by anyone else wins. LUIGs are simplified versions of real systems such as lottery games and Lowest/Highest Unique Bid Auctions that have been attracting attention from scholars, yet experimental studies are still scarce. Here, we consider four LUIGs with N = {3; 4} and M = {3; 4}. We find that (a) choices made by a majority of subjects over 50 rounds of a LUIG were not significantly different from that in the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSE) of the LUIG; however, (b) those subjects who behaved significantly differently from what the MSE predicts won the game more frequently than those who behaved similarly to what the MSE predicts.

Keywords: Lowest Unique Integer Game; Laboratory Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2015-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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http://195.220.190.85/GREDEG-WP-2015-34.pdf First version, 2015 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: An experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games (2016)
Working Paper: An Experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2015-34

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