A Methodological Note on Eliciting Price Forecasts in Asset Market Experiments

Nobuyuki Hanaki, Eizo Akiyama () and Ryuichiro Ishikawa

No 2016-02, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: We investigate (a) whether eliciting future price forecasts influences market outcomes, and (b) whether differences in the way subjects are incentivized to submit ''accurate'' price forecasts influence the market outcomes as well as the forecasts submitted by subjects in an experimental asset market. We consider three treatments: one without forecast elicitation (NF) and two with forecast elicitations. In one of the latter treatments, subjects are paid based on both their performance of forecasting and trading (Bonus), while in the other, they are paid based only on one of the two that is chosen randomly at the end of the experiment (Unique). While we found no statistical differences in terms of mispricing, trading volumes, and trading behavior between NF and Unique treatments, there were some statistically significant differences between NF and Bonus treatments. Thus, if the aim is to avoid influencing the behavior of subjects and the market outcomes by eliciting price forecasts compared to NF treatment, then the Unique treatment seems to be better than the Bonus treatment.

Keywords: Price forecast elicitation; Experimental asset markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-for
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://195.220.190.85/GREDEG-WP-2016-02.pdf First version, 2016 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2016-02

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Patrice Bougette ().