Game Theory, Institutions and the Schelling-Bacharach Principle: Toward an Empirical Social Ontology

Cyril Hédoin and Lauren Larrouy

No 2016-21, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: This article defends a methodological and theoretical claim according to which the combination of epistemic game theory with the recent developments in the so-called “theory of mind” is able to provide an empirically grounded and theoretically consistent perspective on the mechanisms through which institutions determine the individuals’ beliefs and choices. This move toward an empirical social ontology is captured through what we call the Schelling-Bacharach principle in game theory. According to it, game-theoretic analysis of coordination and cooperation should study how the players are actually reasoning in different game situations.

Keywords: Social ontology; epistemic game theory; institutions; theory of Mind; Schelling-Bacharach principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 C72 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2016-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2016-21

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