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What Do We Learn from Market Design?

Nicolas Brisset ()

No 2017-03, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: In this paper we try to show how the social and political acceptance of Roth's market design for kidney exchange provides some explanation of the rejection of market logic. We address three hypotheses generally cited as potential causes of the market rejection of certain goods: (I) the corrupting nature of money, (II) the idea that the market as such would be rejected, and (III) the assumption that the basis for market rejection would be the dominance it implied between seller and buyer. The example of the device developed by Roth, Ünver and Sönmez (2004, 2005) regarding the matching of organs from living donors suggests a fourth hypothesis: the market rejection of organs appears to be based not on the existence of potential domination but on the fact that this market presupposes such domination. In other words, economic domination appears to be a prerequisite for the organ trade: no domination, no market.

Keywords: Market Design; Repugnance; Money; Coercion; Gift-giving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 B41 D47 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2017-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
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