The Unilateral Accident Model under a Constrained Cournot-Nash Duopoly

Gerard Mondello and Evens Salies

No 2018-14, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: This paper extends the basic unilateral accident model to allow for Cournot competition. Two firms compete with production input and prevention as strategic variables under asymmetric capacity constraints. We find that liability regimes exert a crucial influence on the equilibrium price and outputs. Strict liability leads to higher output and higher risk compared to negligence. We also study the conditions under which both regimes converge.

Keywords: Tort Law; Strict Liability; Negligence Rule; Imperfect Competition; Oligopoly; Cournot Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K13 L13 L52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind and nep-law
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http://195.220.190.85/GREDEG-WP-2018-14.pdf First version, 2018 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Unilateral Accident Model under a Constrained Cournot-Nash Duopoly (2021)
Working Paper: The unilateral accidenct model under a constrained Cournot-Nash duopoly (2018)
Working Paper: The unilateral accidenct model under a constrained Cournot-Nash duopoly (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2018-14

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