Does it Pay to Do Novel Science? The Selectivity Patterns in Science Funding

Charles Ayoubi, Michele Pezzoni and Fabiana Visentin

No 2019-37, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: Public funding of science aims to provide the necessary investment for the radical scientific discoveries of tomorrow. This paper brings evidence that the funding process is not always awarding the most novel scientists. Exploiting rich data on all applications to a leading Swiss research funding program, we find that novel scientists have a higher probability of applying for funds than non-novel scientists, but they get on average lower ratings by grant evaluators and have fewer chances of being funded.

Keywords: competitive research grants; public funding evaluation; novelty in science (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I23 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://195.220.190.85/GREDEG-WP-2019-37.pdf First version, 2019 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Does It Pay to Do Novel Science? The Selectivity Patterns in Science Funding (2021)
Working Paper: Does it pay to do novel science? The selectivity patterns in science funding (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2019-37

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