Strict Liability, Scarce Generic Input and Duopoly Competition

Gerard Mondello

No 2021-24, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of strict liability on imperfect competition and shows first that it is not an obstacle to achieving a socially optimal level of care. Second, this result is compromised when firms face a scarce generic asset. Under this asset limitation, this paper shows that competition (here a Cournot-Nash duopoly) leads to a lower level of prevention even if more product at lower price is supplied at the equilibrium. Introducing standards linked to operating permits improves the economy's safety level but may lead firms to exit.

Keywords: Tort Law; Strict Liability; Negligence Rule; Imperfect Competition; Oligopoly; Cournot Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K13 L13 L52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-law
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Related works:
Journal Article: Strict liability, scarce generic input and duopoly competition (2022)
Working Paper: STRICT LIABILITY, SCARCE GENERIC INPUT AND DUOPOLY COMPETITION (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2021-24

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