"The Problem of the Social Cost" and the Legal Rights Question

Gerard Mondello

No 2023-04, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: This article analyzes Coase's notion of "legal rights" in "The Social Cost Problem" and focuses on the part devoted to zero transaction costs. "Legal rights" cover different types of civil rights that Coase groups together in a common understanding in order to facilitate transactions between agents. This article reintroduces the specificity of civil rights in the theoretical examples and case law analyzed by Coase. As a result, neither the effectiveness nor the invariance of Coase's theorem can be proved any more.

Keywords: Legal rights; property rights; Coase; Social Cost; Case law; Coase theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 K13 K23 K32 Q52 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-his, nep-hpe, nep-law and nep-mfd
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://195.220.190.85/GREDEG-WP-2023-04.pdf First version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2023-04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Patrice Bougette ().