Beyond the Threshold: How Electoral Size-Dependent Uncertainty Affects Majority Determination

Giuseppe Attanasi, Anna Maffioletti, Giulia Papini, Patrizia Sbriglia and Maria Luigia Signore
Additional contact information
Giulia Papini: Università degli Studi di Torino
Maria Luigia Signore: Sapienza University of Rome, Italy

No 2023-12, GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France

Abstract: The determination of a majority threshold in any voting system can be influenced by voters' attitudes towards uncertainty. Traditionally, a higher majority threshold is associated with a risk-averse attitude, serving as a means to protect against the tyranny of the majority. Moreover, the absence of ex-ante information regarding the likelihood of the voting outcome introduces a further layer of uncertainty, that of ambiguity, which motivates decision-makers to seek increased protection. In this study, we first provide a thorough formalization of this theoretical prediction, relying on a second-order expected utility model with both risk and ambiguity aversion of the voter toward the voting lottery. Second, we experimentally test its predictions by integrating the majority threshold implication into traditional experiments for risk and ambiguity elicitation. Through a series of classroom experiments run on 2020-2023 (about 1,100 subjects in Italy & France), we analyze how individuals, placed under varying conditions of uncertainty, react to the determination of a barrier threshold. We find a strong correlation between the number of voters and the chosen quorum for a majority: as each subject is only aware of her own voting preference, expanding the electoral base results in a more ambiguous probability about the outcome. This favors more conservative behavior and results in an upward adjustment of the majority threshold.

Keywords: voting lottery; majority threshold; risk and ambiguity attitude; theory-driven experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2023-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-mac, nep-pol and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://195.220.190.85/GREDEG-WP-2023-12.pdf First version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gre:wpaper:2023-12

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in GREDEG Working Papers from Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Patrice Bougette ().