Central bank independence and political pressure in the Greenspan era

Gerard Kuper and Jan Hessel Veurink
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Jan Hessel Veurink: Groningen University

No 14020-EEF, Research Report from University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management)

Abstract: This paper investigates whether political pressure from incumbent presidents influences the Fed

Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mon and nep-pol
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