Non interference in the creation of French metropolitan areas: an indirect way to implicitly merge cities? (In French)

Olivier Thomas

Cahiers du GRES (2002-2009) from Groupement de Recherches Economiques et Sociales

Abstract: Considering that the French metropolitan area makers decided not to respect the 1999’s law and its spirit, this paper intends to highlight the reasons why the French State accepted this situation so easily. First, the degrees of freedom taken by local elected actors are stressed thanks to two examples : the determination of the list of common tasks on the one hand, and the choice of the boundaries of the metropolitan area on the other hand. Then, the idea that the French State, thanks to its non interference and to fiscal incentives, has chosen to go round local inertia with a tacit and indirect strategy is contended. The final long term goal would concern the will to reduce, in spite of the numerous opponents, the number of French cities.

Keywords: French metropolitan areas; urban communities with own taxes; local public economics; merger; fiscal incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H30 H73 R51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-geo, nep-pbe and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grs:wpegrs:2008-12

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