Non-practicing entities and transparency in patent ownership in Europe

Valerio Sterzi, Jean-Paul Rameshkoumar and Johannes van der Pol

Bordeaux Economics Working Papers from Bordeaux School of Economics (BSE)

Abstract: Non-practicing entities (NPEs) file or buy patents from a variety of sources and employ them primarily to obtain license fees by asserting them against accused infringers, without any intention of using the invention they protect. This report gives unique insight into how NPEs game Europe’s patent system for profit. The report also provides further evidence that the problem of NPEs is migrating to Europe from the US, and it proposes policy responses to increase patent ownership transparency. The report is largely based on forensic original research into two cases. These cases point to a serious lack of transparency in patent and corporate ownership. They demonstrate how shell or dormant companies, often of unknown ownership and commonly established in the UK, are used to acquire European patents, and how these companies exploit those patents in courts in the European Union – especially Germany. The report also shows that due to the lack of transparency of patent ownership, the problem of NPEs gaming the system is almost certainly far worse than the report states.

Keywords: Non-practicing entities; Patent trolls; Patent litigation; Patent ownership transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-law and nep-sbm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grt:bdxewp:2020-10

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