Patent Privateering

Adrien Hervouet, Emmanuel Lorenzon, Cesare Righi and Valerio Sterzi

Bordeaux Economics Working Papers from Bordeaux School of Economics (BSE)

Abstract: We study operating companies’ delegation of patent enforcement to patent assertion entities, a practice called “patent privateering.” Using a privateer may allow an operating company to generate higher patent revenues, increase rivals’ costs with “stealth” attacks, and limit the legal responsibilities to bear litigation costs. Using data on European patent transfers and patent infringement litigation in five large European jurisdictions in 2010-2020, we show that patent privateering is more likely to occur for patents with relatively lower economic value, for standard essential patents, and when the target of patent assertion is a competitor of the operating company.

Keywords: intellectual property; patent; patent privateering; patent litigation; patent assertion enentity; SEP (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 K41 O31 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-law, nep-mac and nep-tid
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grt:bdxewp:2023-10

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