A case of evolutionary stable attainable equilibrium in the lab

Christoph Kuzmics and Daniel Rodenburger ()
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Daniel Rodenburger: University of Jena, Germany

No 2018-05, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: The game played by the subjects is a 24 times repeated 28 player game with a particular imperfect monitoring structure. In every one of the 24 stages the 28 players were randomly (re)allocated into two groups of 14 to play a voting stage game. We find that the null hypothesis that play in every stage is given by a particular evolutionary stable attainable equilibrium of the 14 player stage game cannot be rejected if we account for risk-aversion, calibrated in another treatment.

Keywords: Opinion polls; Elections; Voting; Testing; Nash equilibrium; Attainable equilibrium; Symmetries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C52 C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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