Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values

Yuval Heller and Christoph Kuzmics

No 2019-10, Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics

Abstract: We define and characterize renegotiation-proof equilibria of coordination games with preplay communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes. These are such that players never miscoordinate, players coordinate on their jointly preferred outcome whenever there is one, and players communicate only the ordinal part of their preferences. This set of renegotiation proof equilibrium strategies does not depend on the distribution of private preferences, and is thus robust to changes in players beliefs. Moreover, these equilibria are interim Pareto efficient and evolutionarily stable.

Keywords: Coordination games; Renegotiation-proof; Equilibrium entrants; Secret handshake; Incomplete information; Evolutionary robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://unipub.uni-graz.at/obvugrveroeff/download/ ... riginalFilename=true

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:grz:wpaper:2019-10

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://repecgrz.uni-graz.at/RePEc/

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Graz Economics Papers from University of Graz, Department of Economics University of Graz, Universitaetsstr. 15/F4, 8010 Graz, Austria. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stefan Borsky ().