Multiple Blockholders, Audit Committee's Power and Earnings Management: Evidence from Indonesia

Astrid Rudyanto ()
Additional contact information
Astrid Rudyanto: Trisakti School of Management, Indonesia Author-2-Name: Resti Rachma Hidagusti Author-2-Workplace-Name: Trisakti School of Management, Indonesia Author-3-Name: Author-3-Workplace-Name: Author-4-Name: Author-4-Workplace-Name: Author-5-Name: Author-5-Workplace-Name: Author-6-Name: Author-6-Workplace-Name: Author-7-Name: Author-7-Workplace-Name: Author-8-Name: Author-8-Workplace-Name:

GATR Journals from Global Academy of Training and Research (GATR) Enterprise

Abstract: " Objective - The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the impact of the power status of audit committees and multiple blockholders on accrual earnings management. Methodology – This study applied a quantitative research method with secondary data from the annual report. In this research, manufacturing companies were used as samples listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange with a total of 4 years ranging from the period of 2018 – 2021. This research used multiple regression with fixed effect driscoll-kraay standard error. Findings – It is revealed that multiple blockholders have a positive impact on accrual and real earnings management, while the power status of the audit committee has no impact on accrual and real earnings management. It can be implied that in Indonesia, multiple blockholders play a significant role in increasing earnings management, and audit committees' power cannot reduce earnings management in the presence of multiple blockholders. Novelty – Previous literature argues that the power of audit committees should be bigger than management to control earnings management. However, in the context of Indonesia, where a concentrated ownership structure is prevalent, multiple blockholders can play a significant role in earnings management. This study is the first to analyze the negative effect of multiple blockholders in the country, which is dominant with a concentrated ownership structure. If multiple blockholders enjoy the private benefits of control through earnings management, the audit committee's power over management would be useless."

Keywords: Earnings Management; power status of audit committee; multiple blockholder; monitoring; ownership. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C33 D22 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11
Date: 2023-09-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-sea
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Finance and Banking Review, Volume 8, Issue 2

Downloads: (external link)
http://gatrenterprise.com/GATRJournals/JFBR/vol8.2_3.html (application/pdf)
http://gatrenterprise.com/GATRJournals/online_submission.html

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gtr:gatrjs:jfbr216

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in GATR Journals from Global Academy of Training and Research (GATR) Enterprise
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Prof. Dr. Abd Rahim Mohamad ().