Impact of Genetic Testing on Surveillance and Prevention

Lilia Filipova and Michael Hoy
Additional contact information
Lilia Filipova: University of Augsburg

No 904, Working Papers from University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance

Abstract: There is a prospect of substantial advancements in the understanding of the relationship between disease and genetics at least in the medium term to long term future. In this paper we consider the implications on two aspects of behaviour - surveillance to improve the chances of early detection of disease onset and preventive actions to reduce the probability of onset - that may change as a result of the acquisition of information from genetic tests. We argue that there are problems for both private insurance regimes, with risk-rating allowed according to genetic type, and public insurance regimes (or a private insurance system with an "effective" community rating regulation) in generating potential health benefits from increased genetic information. In the public regime appropriate signals to obtain genetic information are not always provided while in the private regime premium risk can block otherwise fruitful acquisitions of this information. In both regimes moral hazard considerations can blunt the adoption of otherwise useful information with the further problem for public insurance of possibly encouraging excessive adoption of genetic testing.

Keywords: value of information; surveillance; prevention. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.uoguelph.ca/economics/repec/workingpapers/2009/2009-04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gue:guelph:2009-4

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stephen Kosempel ().