How Do Electoral Quotas Influence Political Competition? Evidence from Municipal, State, and National Elections in India

Adam Auerbach () and Adam Ziegfeld ()
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Adam Auerbach: American University
Adam Ziegfeld: George Washington University

Working Papers from The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: Countries around the world use electoral quotas to ensure that underrepresented groups gain legislative representation. Despite the fact that electoral quotas are political interventions, the large literature on the subject has mostly ignored their impact on political competition. We argue that electoral quotas diminish the number of viable candidates and increase the extent to which competition revolves around major parties. Furthermore, these effects should be most pronounced in lower-level elections, where candidates can more easily run outside major-party labels. To test our hypotheses, we draw on a rich set of quantitative and interview data collected from original fieldwork in India. We find substantial evidence that the effective number of candidates is lower in electoral districts with quotas and vote shares for major parties are higher. These effects are largest in local elections and smallest in national elections. The paper advances research on electoral competition, party politics, and institutional design.

Keywords: Quotas; Elections; Political Parties; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 67 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2016-16

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