Electoral Manipulation and Regime Support: Survey Evidence from Russia

David Szakonyi and Ora Ruter
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David Szakonyi: George Washington University
Ora Ruter: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee & Higher School of Economics

Working Papers from The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: Does electoral fraud stabilize authoritarian rule or undermine it? The answer to this question rests, in part, on how voters evaluate regime candidates who engage in fraud. Using a survey experiment conducted after the 2016 elections in Russia, we find that voters withdraw their support from ruling party candidates who commit electoral fraud. This effect is especially large among strong supporters of the regime. Core regime supporters are more likely to have ex ante beliefs that elections are free and fair. Revealing that fraud has occurred significantly reduces their propensity to support the regime. These findings illustrate that fraud is costly for autocrats not just because it may ignite protest, but also because it can undermine the regime's core base of electoral support. Because many of its strongest supporters expect free and fair elections, the regime has strong incentives to conceal or otherwise limit its use of electoral fraud.

Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cis, nep-pol and nep-tra
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2020-19

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