Indecent Disclosures: Anti-Corruption Reforms and Political Selection

David Szakonyi
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David Szakonyi: George Washington University

Working Papers from The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: Cracking down on corruption has become a key tool for politicians to build popular support. But little is known about whether anti-corruption measures actually change political behavior. This paper evaluates the effects of a common reform -- financial disclosures -- using data on 25,724 elections in Putin-era Russia. I argue that financial disclosures function like a personal audit, generating information for journalists and prosecutors to investigate illicit gains earned inside and outside of government. Exploiting staggered elections, I find that the passage of a disclosures requirement led to roughly 25% fewer incumbents seeking re-election and 10% fewer candidates with suspicious financial histories. Greater media freedom and law enforcement capacity further increase the risk of corruption and tax evasion being exposed, resulting in even fewer candidacies from those criminally exposed. Increasing transparency changes the incentives for serving in elected office, even in settings where other political motives may be at play.

Keywords: corruption; anti-corruption; Russia; reforms; elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D73 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cis, nep-iue, nep-law, nep-pol and nep-tra
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2020-21

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