Candidate Filtering: The Strategic Use of Electoral Fraud in Russia

David Szakonyi
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David Szakonyi: George Washington University

Working Papers from The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: Incumbents have many tools to tip elections in their favor, yet we know little about how they choose between strategies. By comparing various tactics, this paper argues that electoral malpractice centered on manipulating institutions offers the greatest effectiveness while shielding incumbents from public anger and criminal prosecution. To demonstrate this, I focus on one widespread institutional tactic: preventing candidates from accessing the ballot. First, in survey experiments, Russian voters respond less negatively to institutional manipulations, such as rejecting candidates, than to blatant fraud, such as ballot-box stuffing. Next, using evidence from 25,935 Russian mayoral races, I show that lower societal and implementation costs enable incumbents to strategically reject candidacies from credible challengers and then reduce their electoral vulnerability. In all, the technology behind specific manipulations helps determine when and how incumbents violate electoral integrity.

Keywords: electoral fraud; authoritarianism; Russia; public opinion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cis, nep-pol and nep-tra
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2020-23

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