Endogenous Bid Rotation in Repeated Auctions

Shiran Rachmilevitch

No WP2011/9, Working Papers from University of Haifa, Department of Economics

Abstract: I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff.

Keywords: Auctions; Bid rotation; Collusion; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hevra.haifa.ac.il/econ/wp_files/wp201109.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201109

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Haifa, Department of Economics 199 Aba Khoushy Ave., Mount Carmel, Haifa, Israel, 3498838. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anna Rubinchik ().