Fairness in Bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution

Shiran Rachmilevitch

No WP2011/12, Working Papers from University of Haifa, Department of Economics

Abstract: A bargaining solution guarantees minimal equity if each player's payoff is at least as large as the minimum of the payoffs assigned to him by the equal-gain (i.e., egalitarian) and equal-loss solutions. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is the unique scale-invariant 2-person solution with this property. There does not exist a scale-invariant n-person solution with this property.

Keywords: Bargaining; fairness; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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