The asymptotic core, nucleolus and Shapley value of smooth market games with symmetric large players

Benyamin Shitovitz () and Anna Rubinchik ()
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Benyamin Shitovitz: University of Haifa, Department of Economics, http://hevra.haifa.ac.il/econ

No WP2015/9, Working Papers from University of Haifa, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine the asymptotic nucleolus of a smooth and symmetric oligopoly with an atomless sector in a transferable utility (TU) market game. We provide sufficient conditions for the asymptotic core and the nucleolus to coincide with the unique TU competitive payoff distribution. This equivalence results from nucleolus of a finite TU market game belonging to its core, the core equivalence in a symmetric oligopoly with identical atoms and single-valuedness of the core in the limiting smooth game. In some cases (but not always), the asymptotic Shapley value is more favourable for the large traders than the nucleolus, in contrast to the monopoly case (Einy et al. in J Econ Theory 89(2):186–206, 1999), where the nucleolus allocation is larger than the Shapley value for the atom

Keywords: Mixed; games; ·; Oligopoly; ·; Asymptotic; nucleolus; ·; Asymptotic; Shapley; value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D40 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The asymptotic core, nucleolus and Shapley value of smooth market games with symmetric large players (2015)
Working Paper: The asymptotic core, nucleolus and Shapley value of smooth market games with symmetric large players
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