Punishing greediness in Divide-the-dollar games

Shiran Rachmilevitch

No WP2016/4, Working Papers from University of Haifa, Department of Economics

Abstract: Brams and Taylor (1994) presented a version of the Divide-the-dollar game (DD), which they call DD1. DD1 su ers from the following drawback: when each player demands approximately the entire dollar, then if the least greedy player is unique, then this player obtains approximately the entire dollar even if he is only slightly less greedy than the other players. I introduce a parametrized family of 2-person DD games whose endpoints" (the games that correspond to the extreme points of the parameter space) are (1) a variant of DD1, and (2) a game that completely overcomes the greediness-related problem. I also study an n-person generalization of this family. Finally, I show that the modeling choice between discrete and continuous bids may have far-reaching implications in DD games

Keywords: Bargaining games; Divide-the-dollar; Fair division (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Journal Article: Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games (2017)
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